Singapore’s Changi International Airport has frequently and in consecutive years, been voted by air travellers as the World’s Best Airport in the annual World Airport Awards.
It is unique in that it is a hub in South East Asia for connections from Europe and the Middle East to Oceania, East Asia and to the Americas. It is also a target for terrorism by South East Asia Islamist extremists group Jemaah Islamiyah.
Away from the spotlight of seamless and efficient travel with duty-free shopping and attentive service, key public and private agencies work closely together to continuously review, adapt and deliver a
robust and efficient security system at the Changi International Airport.
To ensure that the airport’s security is aligned with international standards, Civil Aviation Authority of Singapore (CAAS) adapts the International Civil Aviation Organization’s (ICAO) global Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs) on aviation security. It involves the formulation of policies, regulations and emergency preparedness plans, as well as the implementation of security measures and frontline operations.
Four organisations collaborate in the aviation security effort.
The Airport Police Division (APD) as the state authority leads in all aviation security matters.
The other three are;
1. Civil Aviation Authority of Singapore (CAAS), the aviation industry authority and regulatory body.
2. Changi Airport Group (CAG) the airport operator licensee responsible for implementing all required security measures at Changi Airport.
3. Certis CISCO (Certis), the auxiliary police responsible for the day-to-day running of airport security operations.
The National Civil Aviation Security Committee (NCASC), oversees the efforts of these four organisations.
The total size of the Changi International Airport is 1,300 hectares. Terminal 1 of the Changi International Airport was opened in 1981. Terminal 2 followed in 1990 and in 2008 Terminal 3 was opened.
Annually, over 53 million passengers pass through the airport with 6,500 flight departures each week to some 300 cities in 70 countries and territories throughout the world.
In 2013 Changi’s annual air transport movements reached 343,765 with a daily average of 1,057 air transport movements. The busiest day ever recorded at the Changi International Airport for passenger arrivals and departures was 191,819 on 21 December 2013. The number of Changi Airport Group (CAG) employees is approximately 1,500 with the total number of staff engaged with Changi Airport service providers numbering 32,000.
Procedures and Equipment Available to Counter Aviation Terrorism
All operations at the Changi International Airport are aligned with the recommendations of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO).
These measures were introduced following the reported United Kingdom (UK) aviation terror plot in August 2006. Though there is currently no specific threat against civil aviation in Singapore as of November 2014, the ICAO procedures underline the reality and continuation of the global terrorist threat.
Changi International Airport security depends on four levels of security.
1. The public area
2. The transit area
3. The air site
4. The airport perimeter
Security becomes tighter as the traveller moves closer towards airside and the aircraft. A new security initiative is the Threat-Oriented Passenger Screening Integrated System (TOPSIS) that trains non-security communities to identify anyone or anything
unusual. The TOPSIS encourages everyone who works for the airport to play a role in being alert to persons or objects that may be a potential threat in or around the airport as they are the ones who interact with the passengers and airport visitors.
To integrate all procedures, Changi International Airport employs Certis, an elaborate computer system at its onsite CISCO Aviation Security Integrated Operations Centre (CIOC), which centralises planning, command and control over all of Certis’ armed auxiliary police officers and security screening officers. It also keeps track of all flights through the integration of various technologies. This is essential in keeping track of Certis personnel who are responsible for several tasks such as guarding entrances and checkpoints at all
terminals and in the cargo complex, as well as screening passengers and cargo before they board the aircraft. Data from the airport’s Flight Information Display System (FLIDS) is fed into the Certis
system to allow CIOC to deploy its resources and disseminate information quickly and readily. Certis officers monitor 2,000 closed-circuit television (CCTV) cameras in boarding and transit areas.
Hand-carried luggage require that liquids, aerosols and gels (LAGs) must be in containers with a maximum capacity of not more than 100ml each. Liquids, aerosols and gels in containers larger than
100ml will not be accepted, even if the container is only partially filled. Items are subject to additional checks at the security screening point.
Developments in Aviation Security After the 9/11 Attacks
Since September 2001, two critical questions have emerged.
How has the terrorist threat to commercial aviation and airports evolved since 9/11 and how have actions by governments and the operators of airports around the world worked to mitigate this threat?
A number of Al-Qaeda-affiliated plots have sought to target commercial aviation since 9/11. One was an operations plot by Islamist extremists in 2002 to hijack an airliner and crash it into Changi International Airport in Singapore.
Changi International Airport uses Rapiscan Secure 1000 X-Ray technology to penetrate beneath the surface of objects and IonScan Sentinel II, an explosive trace detection device that uncovers minute trace elements of explosives. The airport is currently assessing the use of body scanners.
For air cargo, Keok Tong San, Commander of Changi’s Airport Police Division (APD) states that the airport has introduced technologies that detect nitrogen, an important component of explosives, and has deployed the police K9 unit to detect explosives hidden in cargo. Consignments of cargo transported on commercial passenger aircraft are screened before being loaded onto aircraft under the Regulated Air Cargo Agent Regime introduced to Singapore in April 2008. Patrols are carried out around the airport’s 22km perimeter.
On terminal buildings, the CAG has built a structural hardening framework in bollards and enhanced glazing with anti shatter film and a cable catcher system. The system, together with glass coated with an anti-shatter film, protect passengers, airport workers and assets from any Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device
(VBIED). Surrounding the airport is a 22 kilometres double layered perimeter fence known as a Perimeter Intrusion System (PIS), alerting operators to track any form of trespass into the airport’s precinct.
Identity and document checks by officers of the Immigration and Checkpoints Authority (ICA) are conducted thoroughly. Since May 2008, the ICA has leveraged on the Mobile INTERPOL Network Database to scrutinise passports against INTERPOL’s Stolen and Lost Travel Documents database. Suspicious travellers who may have been found to be on a Movement Alert List (MAL) are subjected to enhanced screening and further interviewing.
Hand carried luggage is screened by x-ray before a passenger
proceeds to the immigration check-point desk. Suspicious travellers identified by “on patrol” immigration officers, are asked to complete
a mobile finger print scan and participate in a secondary interview.
At immigration desks, face-to-face checks, passport validity and database comparisons are completed before “flapper gates” are
opened to allow passengers to enter the airport’s transit area or “airside”.
All luggage, which includes hand carry bags arriving in Singapore and transferring to another aircraft undergoes a 100 per cent Hold Baggage Screening System (HBSS).
Analysis
Singapore’s Changi International Airport has progressively implemented aviation security measures restricting passengers’ baggage items and handling unattended bags in accordance with the recommendations of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). The airport is cited as one of the world’s most proactive airports at initiating security arrangements inside and outside its perimeter with the employment of security equipment, such as conventional x-ray, video systems and Electronic Data Systems (EDS).
The airport is alert to the possibility of an “insider threat” which may become markedly worse at non-Western airport regions where there are poorly structured terrorist profiles and incomplete criminal intelligence databases.
Man-portable Air Defence Systems (MANPADS) and Rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) have been described as a possible threat to commercial aviation in Singapore. Commercial aircraft would become vulnerable for several miles while ascending and descending, particularly due to their lack of countermeasure systems.
Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) can be concealed internally either by the surgically implanting devices in a would-be suicide bomber or by the simpler route of secreting the device within a body cavity. Commercial airline’s information technology systems, which handle critical functions such as reservations, crew check-in, flight control centres, meteorology and emergency management functions may soon be the targets of terrorists.
The trend toward attacking airports rather than aircraft has likely been driven by increased checkpoint screening measures and terrorists’ growing emphasis on decentralized, small-scale attacks on targets of opportunity.
Analysis of the airport’s security system and identification of loopholes
It is fair to conclude that the Changi International Airport has shown that it has current international best practices in place to detect, prevent and deter an aviation terrorist event.
In 2004 Changi International Airport introduced FAST Fully Automated Seamless Travel. The FAST process is based on a biometrics technology that integrates three processes. These processes incorporate airline check-in, pre-immigration security checks and immigration clearance. As a result Changi International Airport has improved security and considerably reduced passenger identification errors.
However, some recent incidents in 2014 have raised questions about the airport’s ability to prevent and mitigate damage in the event of similar incidents. In June 2014, security forces engaged in a gun battle with Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) terrorists inside the Jinnah International Airport in Karachi.
In preventing a similar attack on the Changi International Airport, the integrity of the airport’s perimeter should be considered in addition to the ability for intending terrorists to obtain identity credentials that would have them recognized as authorized personnel.
The disappearance of Malaysia Airlines Flight MH370 has exposed serious security gaps and loopholes in the international aviation system. While not the original responsibility of Singapore, (it was the responsibility of Malaysia) if MH370 had been hijacked, the aircraft could have been crashed into a highly populated civilian retail and tourist location such as Orchard Road in Singapore, into one of Singapore’s high rise buildings or into the terminal structures of Changi International Airport itself.
Professor Rohan Gunaratna, International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) Singapore has stated that any country that loses sight or contact with one of its aircraft is obliged to alert other countries. Professor Gunaratna had asked if this was done when MH370 went missing.
Dr. Bilveer Singh, a senior adjunct fellow at the Centre of Excellence for National Security, Singapore has asked the question “Was Singapore alerted to the missing plane? Considering the use of aircraft as weapons to attack iconic targets, it should become mandatory for those responsible for tracking airlines to inform their governments and neighbouring governments. Did Malaysia inform Singapore when MH370 went missing?”
While it is possible that Singapore could mobilize its air force and proceed to take protective measures to minimize the consequences of such an attack, it is unlikely that the airport precinct could be completely evacuated of thousands of travellers, employees and airport visitors before the impact of a terrorist event of this nature.
Mr. Doron Bergerbest-Elion, a former senior Israeli counter-terrorism and aviation security officer in the Israel Security Agency believes that there needs to be a regular vetting and updating of profiles of flight deck crew and cabin crew and that the scrutinizing process must be strengthened to detect human resource changes that may pose a risk.
The following is a list of threats that require mitigation action.
• Terrorists could check-in baggage at a low security airport in South East Asia. The baggage could be detonated upon arrival at Changi International Airport.
• Detonation of explosives in airport terminal.
• Adding explosives to fuel.
• Inserting explosives in aircraft spare parts for installation during maintenance.
• Hiding light aircraft in low security airports for later use as missiles.
• Poisoning of pilots by a hired crew member.
• Disguising chemical and bacteriological weapons as medicine with a prescription.
• Chemically eliminating traces of explosives.
• Galvanised containers against true content detection.
The following are suggested measures with the objective of strengthening the airport’s security system.
Changi International Airport must continue the timely collection and exploitation of intelligence as the most effective means of intercepting terrorist threats to aviation.
Singapore’s aviation security regulators should consider increasing their liaison with the airline industry regarding the development of risk mitigation strategies. Airlines are far more aware of the vulnerabilities inherent to commercial aviation, as well as the practical constraints on proposed security measures.
Where necessary the Government of Singapore should consider providing human, material and financial resources to support airlines attempting to improve security for their overseas operations.
Basic security procedures, relevant to the operation of Changi International Airport must continue to be applied. Aviation security warnings must be understood and be clearly visible as vital public information.
It is imperative that all partners and stakeholders in the Changi International Airport’s operation and aviation security in general, enjoy an effective working relationship with the print and electronic media.
There must be experienced negotiators available in the event of a terrorist incident. It is essential that there is seamless cooperation with the Singapore military.
The level of preparation necessary to implement these measures.
The Government of Singapore has clearly taken a lead role in the coordination and implementation of effective aviation security practices at the Changi International Airport. A large scale terrorist attack would put at risk the country’s economic freedom and reputation which is rated as second highest in the world.
The Government has demonstrated it will endeavor to preserve this by continuing to maintain a position of leadership and preparedness against aviation terrorism, on par with aviation safety levels in Europe, through appropriate policies and support in financial, material and human resources.
As stated in academic research by Hainmuller and Lemnitzer, “Why do Europeans Fly Safer? The Politics of Airport Security in Europe and the US”, institutional factors can contribute to a variation in
performance factors with respect to aviation security regimes. Research has shown that where responsibility of airport security has been delegated to government, a satisfactory performance has been the result over and above the performance of airline companies where cost cutting measures have produced poor performance.