This paper provides a description of Australia’s Counter-Terrorism Strategy as published in 2012.
It describes the role of the Australian Federal Police and the integration with police services in states and territories of Australia.
The processes through which the management of intelligence takes place is explained.
Through assessment and analyses, this paper provides an evaluation of the effectiveness of Australia’s Counter-Terrorism Strategy, Plans and Policies and offers a comparison with the counterterrorism plans of two other countries.
Areas of concern that appear to have been overlooked are highlighted. An assessment of the National Counter-Terrorism Strategy’s performance with respect to Australia’s most recent terrorism event in Sydney on 15-16 December 2014 is presented.
Background and History
Australia has known acts of modern terrorism since the 1960s. In the decade of the 1970s, the Federal Parliament enacted legislation seeking to specifically target terrorism and define it as “an action or threat of action where the action causes certain defined forms of harm or interference and the action is done or the threat is made with the intention of advancing a political, religious or ideological cause”.
In a government publication, transnational terrorism in particular is identified as a threat to Australia, driven by radical Islam.
In Australia, there have been a number of terrorist events before 11 September 2001.
• 1915 – politically / religiously motivated killings at Broken Hill in New South Wales.
• 1972 – bombing of the Yugoslav General Trade Agency in Sydney.
• 1978 – bombing of the Sydney Hilton hotel during a Commonwealth Heads of Government Regional
Meeting.
• 1980 – assassination of the Turkish Consul-General in Sydney.
• 1982 – bombing of the Israeli Consulate and the Hakoah Soccer Club in Sydney.
• 1986 – bombing of the Russell Street Police Station in Melbourne.
• 1986 – bombing at the Turkish Consulate in Melbourne.
On 15 December 2014, two hostages and a lone gunman were killed when the gunman – a self-styled Iranian cleric – entered the Lindt Chocolate Café in Sydney’s Martin Place.
This siege event continued for over 17 hours and concluded at about 0230 on 16 December 2014.
For the earlier terrorism events of the 70s and 80s it could be argued they were successfully executed because there had been little or no integration of all agencies of the Australian intelligence community and the absence of a national counter terrorism plan.
In January 2008, Dr. Rohan Gunaratan, Head of the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research at Nanyang Technological University in Singapore warned that a “New crop of home-grown jihadis, groomed to step up and replace the leaders of Australian terror cells who have been arrested or jailed, is almost “mature” enough to launch an operation”.
On 21 October 2010, the Prime Minister of Australia and the Attorney General opened the Australian Government’s Counter Terrorism Control Centre (CTCC). The CTCC is hosted by the Australian Security and Intelligence Organisation (ASIO), with representatives from the Australian Federal Police (AFP), the Australian Secret Intelligence Service (ASIS) and the Defence Signals Directorate (DSD).
National Counter Terrorism Plan 2012
In 2012 with the intention of continuing to ensure that Australia’s ability to respond to terrorism remains robust and that national and state police and security and intelligence agencies are appropriately resourced and in a state of constant preparedness, the Government announced the National Counter-Terrorism Plan (NCTP).
The National Counter-Terrorism Plan (NCTP) sets out Australia’s strategic approach to preventing, and dealing with, acts of terrorism in Australia and its territories. It is the primary document on Australia’s national counter-terrorism policy and arrangements.
Of significant note is a statement that NCTP does not cover arrangements that deal with terrorist acts overseas involving Australians or Australian interests.
The NCTP is a document of twenty-seven pages that articulates Australia’s strategic approach to terrorism. It emphasizes the need to prepare for, prevent, respond to and recover from, an act of terrorism. It uses the letters PPRR to highlight the key words message.
This paper refers to these NCTP elements as pillars.
The first pillar of preparedness refers to the process of planning, resourcing and testing to ensure governments, agencies and the community are best able to prevent or deal with the impacts of a terrorist act. The NCTP recognises that the need for interoperability between agencies and jurisdictions is vitally important.
Consequently, plans must be consistent, complementary and coordinated. Central to the criminal regime is a clear definition of a terrorist act as an action or threat intended to advance a political, ideological or religious cause by coercing or intimidating an Australian or foreign government or the public, by causing serious harm to people or property, endangering life, creating a serious risk to the health and safety of the public or seriously disrupting trade, critical infrastructure or electronic systems.
The NCTP details relevant responsibilities and roles in the pillar for preparedness.
• The Commonwealth Government
• National Crisis Committee (NCC)
• Australian Government Crisis Coordination Centre (CCC),
• Police Coordination – between all Commissioners of Police – Emergency Management Coordination
• Health Coordination
• Transport Security Coordination
• Security Intelligence – coordinated by the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO,
• Commonwealth Government Coordination
• National Security Committee of Cabinet (NSC) – chaired by the Prime Minister
• Secretaries Committee on National Security (SCNS)
• National Security Adviser (NSA)
• Australian Government Crisis Committee (AGCC)
• Interdepartmental Emergency Task Force (IDETF)
• Australian Government Disaster Recovery Committee (AGDRC)
• National Security Policy Coordination Group (NSPCG)
• International Development (AusAID)
• Australian Customs and Border Protection Service (ACBPS)
• Australian Crime Commission (ACC)
• Australian Federal Police (AFP)
• AGD, ASIO, DFAT, Defence
• Department of Immigration and Citizenship (DIAC)
• Department of Infrastructure and Transport (DoIT)
• Prime Minister & Cabinet
• Protective Security Policy Framework (PSPF)
The NCTP strategy includes the National Terrorism Public Alert System which consists of the following four stages.
1. Low – a terrorist attack is not expected.
2. Medium – a terrorist attack could occur.
3. High – a terrorist attack is likely.
4. Extreme – a terrorist attack is imminent or has occurred.
Prevention refers to measures taken to eliminate or reduce the occurrence or severity of a terrorist act. It includes the establishment of a strong Australian community that resists the development of homegrown terrorism and violent extremism within Australia.
The salient areas of Australia’s NCTP with respect to prevention measures include the following.
• Intelligence – In an evolving and increasingly complex national security environment, the need for timely and accurate intelligence to inform responses to challenges will increase. Intelligence is collected and developed by agencies across the Australian national security community including the Australian Intelligence Community and the Federal, State and Territory Police.
• The National Intelligence Coordination Committee (NICC)
• The Counter-Terrorism Control Centre (CTCC)
• Threat Assessment Centre (NTAC)
• Criminal Investigation
• Protection of the Community
• Public Awareness
• Border Control
• Transport Security
• Aviation – The Aviation Transport Security Act (2004) and the Transport Security Program (TSP)
• Maritime
• Surface Transport
• Dignitary and Foreign Mission Protection
• Business and Community
• Awareness and Vigilance
• Maintaining Flow of Information
• Countering Violent Extremism
• Protecting of Australia’s Major Events
• Critical Infrastructure Protection
• Cyber Security
At selected airports the Australian Federal Police (AFP) provide initial response pending State or Territory Police attendance. The AFP also operates the Air Security Officer program, which places officers on selected flights to counter terrorist threats. Relevant airport operators maintain Airport Security Incident Support Teams to provide logistical assistance to Police Commanders. To facilitate support to State and Territory Police, the AFP has in place Regional Rapid Deployment Teams (RRDT).
The Australian Federal Police and State and Territory Police Services share responsibility for the security of Australian high office holders, diplomatic and consular officials, visiting dignitaries, internationally protected persons and other individuals assessed to be at risk.
The third pillar of the NCTP is response.
This refers to actions taken immediately to prevent or minimise loss of life, injury, damage to property and damage or disruption to infrastructure. It includes investigations into the terrorist act, the prosecution of offenders and ensuring that people affected by the threat or act are given immediate relief and support. Response includes operational arrangements in which State and Federal Police will respond to any incidents and where there is a reasonable suspicion that the incident is terrorism related, the state, territory or federal police will assume control and notify the CCC.
The following are elements of the NCTP with respect to response.
Operational Arrangements – Police Commanders will consider the requirements of recovery support agencies. ASIO and the AFP provide a Commonwealth Technical Response Capability (CTRC) to support forward police and ADF commanders by providing specialist technical surveillance collection at the scene of a terrorist incident.
Response further includes
• Coordination arrangements between State, Territory and the Commonwealth Government.
• Media Liaison.
• Postal Security.
• Chemical Biological and Nuclear Threats.
• Explosive devices.
Immediate relief and support to those most affected. This provides a transition to the next phase in the NCTP – that of recovery.
The fourth pillar of the NCTP lists recovery. It is the coordinated process of supporting affected communities in reconstruction of the physical infrastructure and restoration of psychological, social, economic, environmental and physical wellbeing in keeping with the National Principles for Disaster Recovery.
Recovery phase also includes the following.
• Roles and Responsibilities – of State and Territory Governments with Commonwealth Government
support.
• Operational Coordination Arrangements
• Commonwealth Government Level Resources
• State/Territory Level responsible agencies
• Regional/District/ Local Level responsibilities
• Key Considerations – transitional arrangements from response to recovery.
Analysis
Australia’s policy is, wherever possible, to resolve terrorist acts through negotiation to minimise the risk to life. Australia will not make concessions in response to terrorist demands. Police will maintain a cadre of trained negotiators and a containment and deliberate/emergency action capability. Defence also maintains containment and deliberate/emergency action capability.
When assessing and analysing Australia’s National Counter Terrorism Plan, it is useful to compare its effectiveness with the counter terror strategies of other countries. The United Kingdom’s counter-terrorism strategy is known as CONTEST.
CONTEST was developed by the Home Office in early 2003. Since then there have been a number of revisions, the most recent in March 2013. The revised version of CONTEST places more focus on prevention and the means by which to best alert the public of a terrorist threat.
Similar to Australia’s NCTP 3rd Edition 2012, CONTEST is split into four work streams that are known within the counter-terrorism community as the ‘four P’s’.
These are Prevent, Pursue, Protect, and Prepare.
Prevent sets out to stop people from supporting terrorism or becoming a perpetrator.
Pursue is to stop by detecting, prosecuting and disrupting those who may plot to carry out an act of terrorism against the UK or its interest overseas or abroad.
Protect sets out to strengthen protection against a terrorist attack against the UK or its overseas interest and so reduce its vulnerability.
Prepare is to mitigate the impact of a terrorist attack where that attack cannot be stopped.
Australia’s National Counter Terrorism Plan 3rd Edition 2012 compares favourably with CONTEST in that it comprehensively addresses the same international and domestic issues presented by terrorism.
Within the Asia Pacific region it is useful to compare Australia’s strategy to that of India.
Two years after the National Counter-Terrorism Centre (NCTC) was first conceived in 2010 and following the Mumbai 2008 terror strikes and three months after the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) gave
its approval for its establishment, Chief Ministers have virtually vetoed the NCTC on the grounds that its functioning will undermine the federal structure of India’s Constitution and that it must not be placed under the Intelligence Bureau (IB).
India’s NCTC had been envisaged as an umbrella organization empowered to conduct counter-terrorism operations like its US Counterpart. Without an effective NCTC, the planning and execution of India’s counter-terrorism policies remain mired in systemic weaknesses. There is a gross disconnect between how the Central and State Governments view counter terrorism.
By comparison, Australia’s National Counter Terrorism Plan 3rd Edition 2012 has been accepted by all levels of government and implemented and then tested at the time of a terrorism event on 15 December 2014.
The spectre of terror hitting Australian soil seemed to many a fanciful idea. Government passed legislation to stop Australian born Muslim men from leaving to board flights to Syria and Afghanistan.
But were our politicians and the security authorities too focused on this and not on keeping in check the unstable, disaffected lone wolf, attaching personal grievance to a political cause?
Retiring ASIO Chief David Irvine warned that a terrorist attack in Australia was highly likely. Irvine said it could be a Bali-style bombing or an attack by a loner.
Former Senior Defence Officer, Peter Jennings, who heads the Australian Strategic Policy Institute think tank and the advisory team for the Government’s Defence White Paper, stated that in an open society like Australia it will never be possible to stop people self-radicalising. The self-radicalised lone wolf will remain very hard to counter as there can never be 100 per cent security. There is a need for an increased focus on policing rather than at the national intelligence level.
Since 2001, Australian intelligence agencies have prevented several terrorist attacks in any Australian city. Thirty eight people have been prosecuted under the Australian Criminal Code Act on terrorism-related charges in the post-9/11 era.
When considering areas of Australia’s NCTP that have been omitted or components that have not been addressed, it will be useful to know the degree to which strategic intelligence and tactical intelligence were used ahead of the terrorist event in Sydney, 15 December 2014. If there was a counter terrorism failure, was it a failure of intelligence or a failure to act on intelligence? Failures can be traced to a failure to act on long-term warnings or strategic intelligence.
Considering this postulation, was there a gap between the expectations of decision-makers and the capabilities of strategic intelligence agencies and poor responsiveness on the part of the decision makers (intelligence consumers), which created a knowledge vacuum between strategic intelligence and short term or tactical intelligence?
In Silent Warfare, Abram Shusky and Gary Schmidt argue an intelligence failure is essentially a misunderstanding of the situation that leads a government (or its security forces) to take actions that are inappropriate and counterproductive to its own interests.
Following the “Sydney siege event” questions now emerge concerning the lessons learned for Australia’s policymakers?
Till recently the NSW Police response had been considered impressive. The siege area was isolated and an evacuation of a section of the Central Business District was calmly managed.
Public Communication was handled at an appropriate level.
The National Security Committee quickly moved to a response footing with a focus on crisis management. The government’s response had been calm and proportionate. The decision made in September to elevate the terrorism threat level to “high” appears to have been justified.
However, a consistent and concentrated effort must be directed to make sure schools, mental health institutions and police and intelligence agencies are geared to respond early to signs of the lone-wolf pathology emerging in the behaviour of individuals.
NOTE: In 2015 the Australian Government revised the National Counter-Terrorism Strategy 2012 and issued two additional reviews which addressed the Commonwealth’s counter-terrorism arrangements.
The Review of Australia’s Counter-Terrorism Machinery and Australia’s Counter-Terrorism Strategy, Strengthening Our Resilience were published in 2015. Read this document here